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I. INTRODUCTION
In the autumn of 2012, Ralls Corporation, a Chinese-owned wind farm
developer, brought suit against the Committee for Foreign Investment in
the United States (“CFIUS”) and Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary of the
Treasury. CFIUS had issued an order requiring Ralls Corporation to
immediately cease operations and divest its interest in four small wind
farms in Oregon after CFIUS identified national security concerns stemming
from Ralls Corporation’s acquisition of the wind farms. 1 CFIUS gave
national security grounds for blocking the transaction; one of the wind
farms acquired by Ralls potentially reduced naval airspace for low-level
military aircraft training.2 In February 2013, the United States District
Court of the District of Columbia granted the government’s motion to
dismiss and held, inter alia, that Ralls Corporation’s due process challenge to
the order issued by CFIUS was moot.3
The American public has long viewed foreign direct investment
(“FDI”) with suspicion, even though foreign investment in the United
States economy generates revenue and creates jobs, because FDIs result
in effective control of significant assets in America.4 CFIUS is an inter-

1. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 29, Ralls Corp. v. Comm.
on Foreign Inv. In the U.S., 926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-01513),
available at http://www.iflr.com/pdfs/IFLRNY/RALLS_CORPORATION_v_COMMITTEE
_%20COMPLAINT.pdf. The Amended Order Establishing Interim Mitigation Measures
also prohibited Ralls from completing a sale or transfer of the project companies until after
it removed “[a]ll items deposited, installed, or affixed (including concrete foundations).”).
Id. at 2.
2. Id. at 8.
3. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 926 F. Supp. 2d 71, 99
(D.D.C. 2013).
4. Margaret L. Merrill, Overcoming CFIUS Jitters: A Practical Guide for Understanding
the Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 2 (2011).
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agency committee that, among other things, monitors FDIs.5 CFIUS may
review any transaction that could result in foreign control of a company
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.6 “CFIUS may
further investigate, modify, block, or unwind any acquisition or similar
transaction that could result in foreign control of a U.S. business where
such control is likely to impair or threaten U.S. national security.”7 In the
past decade, CFIUS has become more active in investigating transactions.8
Between 2007 and 2010, the number of transactions CFIUS reviewed
increased almost tenfold.9
While CFIUS has flagged several FDI transactions as threats to national
security, the most recent National Security Strategy Report from the
White House declared “cyber security and countering intelligence threats”
to be pressing security priorities.10 However, no alarm bells have sounded
regarding the continuation of the EB-5 Investor Visa Program, under
which 10,000 visas are allocated each year to alien investors who invest

5. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL333888, THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 5 (2014).
6. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(D)(i) (“[t]he President or Committee may
initiate a review. . . of any covered transaction. . .”); Id. at § 2170(a)(3) (“The term
‘covered transaction’ means any merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed or
pending after August 23, 1988, by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign
control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” ).
7. Merrill, supra note 4, at 9–10; 50 U.S.C. app § 2170(b)(2)(A) (“In each case
described in subparagraph (B), the Committee shall immediately conduct an investigation . . .
and take any necessary action in connection with the [covered] transaction. . . .”); 50
U.S.C. app § 2170(b)(2)(B)(i) (“Subparagraph (A) shall apply in each case in which . . .
(I) the transaction threatens to impair national security . . . and that threat has not been
mitigated during or prior to the review . . . (II) the transaction is a [FGCE]; or (III) the
transaction would result in control of any critical infrastructure . . . if the Committee
determines that the transaction could impair national security. . .”). CFIUS may also institute
an investigation in any case where “the lead agency recommends, and the Committee
concurs. . .”); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(2)(B)(ii).
8. James D. Carlson, William V. Dunlap, Adrianne Goins, Geoffrey M. Goodale,
Jonathan Michael Meyer, Jason I. Poblete, Guy C. Quinlan, & Michael O. Walker, Nat’l
Security Law, 47 INT’L LAW 453, 454 (2013).
9. Id. The number of transactions reviewed grew “from a meager 4 percent in
2007, to 15 percent in 2008, and to 38 percent in 2009 and 2010.” Id.
10. “Cybersecurity threats represent one of the most serious national security,
public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation. . . Our daily lives and public
safety depend on power and electric grids, but potential adversaries could use cyber
vulnerabilities to disrupt them on a massive scale.” NAT’L SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT,
27 (May 2010) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
national_security_strategy.pdf.
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in a commercial enterprise that will create at least ten jobs for U.S.
citizens.11 To receive an EB-5 visa, alien investors must first file Form I526.12 Then, alien investors are granted conditional residence in the United
States.13 After two years, alien investors can file an I-829 to remove
residency conditions and begin the process of becoming a U.S. citizen.14
In addition to providing the mechanism for admitting people into the
country, immigration law and policy is a strong tool for accomplishing
national security aims. However, the EB-5 Visa Program appears at odds
with the national security concerns underlying CFIUS scrutiny. Though
FDIs have been subject to increasing scrutiny for national security
reasons, foreign investments made through the EB-5 Program as a means
of securing citizenship have not. Instead, EB-5 visas have become easier
and easier to obtain.15 Like FDIs, investments made through the EB-5
Program implicate foreign investments, which can range greatly in size,
and can involve any industry. Because it is difficult to distinguish FDIs
and EB-5 investment in terms of the national security threats posed,16 the
stark contrast between CFIUS review and the minimal oversight of EB-5
investments is troubling. Recent Treasury Department incidents and a shift
in characterization of current national security threats, particularly when
coupled with a recent surge in EB-5 visa use, call into question the
advisability of continuing the EB-5 Visa Program as it currently exists.
This Comment examines whether continuation of the EB-5 Visa Program,
as it currently stands, must be assessed in light of national security
concerns. Part II will discuss the basics of acquiring an EB-5 Visa. Part
III will discuss the changes in EB-5 requirements since the program was
created, the recent surge in demand for EB-5 visas, and problems of EB5 fraud. Part IV will examine the shift in perceived national security
threats since the creation of the EB-5 Program and recent actions by
CFIUS. Part V will address several shortcomings of the EB-5 Program
and conclude that the EB-5 Visa, as it currently exists, is inadvisable in
light of the recent national security concerns flagged by CFIUS and is
11. Immigration and Nationality Act [hereinafter INA] § 203(b)(5); 8 U.S.C. §
1153(b)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6. See also “Employment Creation Immigrant Visa (EB-5)
Program Recommendations” Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services
Ombudsman 3 (Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter March 2009 Ombudsman Report], available
at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOmbudsmanEB-5Recommendation31809.pdf.
12. USCIS Policy Memorandum 602-0083: “EB-5 Adjudications Policy” 20 (May
20, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 EB-5 Adjudications Policy Memorandum], available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2013/May/EB-5%20
Adjudications%20PM%20(Approved%20as%20final%205-30-13).pdf.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Section III, Subsection B, infra.
16. See Section IV, infra.
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inconsistent with the policies underlying CFIUS review. Part VI will
suggest alternatives to remedy several national-security shortcomings of
the EB-5 Program.
II. THE EB-5 VISA—BASICS AND REQUIREMENTS
The Immigration Act of 1990 (“IMMACT”), among other things,
established new categories for admission into the United States.17 The
IMMACT created five employment-based (“EB”) immigration categories,
allowing recipients of EB visas and their immediate family members to
obtain legal permanent resident status and, eventually, U.S. citizenship.18
While the first four EB categories are truly employment-based, the fifth
category (EB-5) is based upon investment and employment-creation.19
Ten thousand visas are allocated to the EB-5 category annually.20
To qualify for an EB-5 visa, an investing alien must have established—
and be entering the United States for the purpose of —“engaging in a new
commercial enterprise.”21 That investment must benefit the United States
economy22 and create employment for at least ten United States citizens
or employment-authorized immigrants (excluding the principal alien and
their spouse, sons, or daughters).23 The investor must also be able to
demonstrate that the capital on which the investment is based was obtained
by lawful means.24 There are no limitations on the type of enterprise into
which an alien investor may invest.25
17. Pub. L. No. 100-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended in several
sections of 8 U.S.C.); INA, supra note 11, at § 203.
18. INA, supra note 11, at § 203(b).
19. The first four categories provide a conditional-residency visa on the basis of:
priority workers (EB-1); persons with exceptional ability or advanced degrees (EB-2);
professionals, skilled and unskilled workers (EB-3); and special immigrants (EB-4).
Summary of the New Employment-Based Categories, in RICHARD STEEL & MICHAEL
PATRICK, EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRATION: NEW LAW AND NEW STRATEGIES 2 (1992).
20. March 2009 Ombudsman Report, supra note 11, at 3.
21. INA, supra note 11, at § 203(b)(5)(A). The alien must have invested (after
November 29, 1990) or be in the process of investing no less than a certain sum (normally,
$1,000,000). The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor and the
Secretary of State, may, by regulation, increase the requisite investment amount. See INA,
supra note 11, at § 203(b)(5)(C)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(C)(i) (2012).
22. INA, supra note 11, at § 203(b)(5)(A)(ii); 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(5)(A)(ii) (2012).
23. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j) (2014).
24. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j).
25. “[T]he regulation governing the EB-5 Program defines the term ‘commercial
enterprise’ broadly, consistent with the realities of the business world and the many different
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A major goal of Congress in establishing the investment-based category
was to attract foreign investment into less-developed regions.26 Therefore,
3,000 EB-5 visas are set aside each year for “targeted employment areas,”
rural areas or areas that have experienced high unemployment (at least
one and a half times the national average rate).27 To encourage investment
into targeted employment areas, the required investment amount is
lessened to $500,000.28
All EB-5 petitions are filed with the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“CIS”).29 As part of the procedure for obtaining a
green card––also known as “legal permanent resident” (“LPR”) status––
through investment, the immigrant investor must file an I-526 form.30 “In
the case of multiple investors, each foreign investor seeking EB-5 status
must independently qualify for the EB-5 visa and file a[n] I-526 form.”31
The I-526 form requires an applicant to provide personal information,
information about the investment project, information about the composition
of the petitioner’s investment, and information about employment creation
(including how many jobs will be created by the investor’s investment).32
Additionally, the I-526 form is three pages in length.33 The I-526 form
also contains no sections inquiring into an applicant’s business ties or
prior criminal history.34
forms and types of structures that job-creating activities can have.” 2013 EB-5 Adjudications
Policy Memorandum, supra note 12, at 9.
26. March 2009 Ombudsman Report, supra note 11, at 4. “A Senate Committee
Report stated that the EB-5 provision was ‘intended to provide new employment for U.S.
workers and to infuse new capital in the country, not to provide immigrant visas to wealthy
individuals’ [S. Rep. No. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 21 (1989).]. . . . To encourage use
of the EB-5 visa category, Congress established the Immigrant Investor Pilot Program in
1993 and set aside 3,000 of the allocated 10,000 visas for investors who invest within
designated “regional centers.” Id.
27. ‘“Rural area” is defined as any area other than an area within a standard
metropolitan statistical area or within the outer boundary of any city or town having a
population of 20,000 or more based on the most recent decennial census.” OFFICE OF THE
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, EMPLOYMENT CREATION IMMIGRATION VISA
(EB-5) PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS 3–4 (2009) (citing to S. REP. NO. 55, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. at 21 (1989)).
28. See INA, supra note 11, at § 203(b)(5)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(f)(2).
29. 2013 EB-5 Adjudications Policy Memorandum, supra note 12, at 20. “The EB5 Program provides that the immigrant investor will file an initial petition and supporting
documentation to be classified as eligible to apply for an EB-5 visa through USCIS’s
adjustment of status process within the United States or through the Department of State’s visa
application process abroad.” Id.
30. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(a) (2014).
31. Id.
32. See FORM I-526, IMMIGRANT PETITION (Exp. Sept. 30, 2016), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-526.pdf.
33. See id.
34. Id.
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Once CIS accepts an I-526 form, CIS checks for completeness.35 CIS
will then approve the petition, deny the petition, or request more
information.36 The decision on Form I-526 involves a determination of
whether the applicant has established eligibility for the requested benefit.37 If
an alien investor establishes eligibility, the petition will be approved.38
After approval of the I-526 form, CIS grants an immigrant investor two
years of conditional permanent resident status.39 Within the 90-day period
before the second anniversary of obtaining lawful permanent residence,40
the investor must submit an I-829 petition to remove the conditional
status.41 The petition must contain facts and information demonstrating
that: (1) a commercial enterprise was established by the alien; (2) the alien
invested or was actively in the process of investing the requisite capital;
and (3) the alien “sustained the actions” described in those two
requirements throughout the period of the alien’s residence in the United
States.42 The regulations also require an investor to provide evidence that
the investment has created, or will create, within a reasonable period of
time, ten full-time jobs for U.S. workers.43 The petition must include an
audited financial statement or “other probative evidence” to show
establishment of a viable commercial enterprise44 The period of conditional
residence counts toward the period of lawful residence required for
naturalization.45

35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Instructions for Form I-526, Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur, OMB
No. 1615-0026; Exp. 09/30/2016, 3. “If you have established that you qualify for investor
status, the petition will be approved.” Id. As such, there is no discretion in approval or
denial of I-526 applications, in contrast to other immigration benefits.
39. INA, supra note 11, at §216A(c)(1)(A); The EB-5 visa imposes a two-year
conditional residency upon an investor whose I-526 form has been approved. Id. Congress
was concerned that the employment creation category would attract fraudulent investments.
STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR ET. AL., EB-5 IMMIGRANT INVESTORS, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
HANDBOOK 63, 76 (2009 ed., 2008). In response, the investor provision is accompanied by a
fraud-deterrent statutory scheme, which is similar to that of the two-year conditional
resident status for immigrant visas based upon marriages. Id.
40. INA, supra note 11, at §216A(c)(1)(A).
41. Id. at § 216A(d)(2)(A).
42. INA, supra note 11, at §§ 216A(c)(1)(A), 216A(d)(2)(A), (B) and (C).
43. 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(a)(4)(iv).
44. Id. at § 216.6(a)(4)(ii).
45. See INA, supra note 11, at § 216A(e).
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The INA, as amended, provides a procedure for the adjustment of an
alien’s status from immigrant to LPR and, eventually, to United States
citizen.46 In addition to possessing the rights to live and work in the United
States, LPRs are also able to file petitions that allow family members to
obtain LPR status.47 However, “there are many circumstances that can
lead to loss of status, including certain criminal conduct, extended absences
from the United States, assisting other persons to enter the U.S. unlawfully,
using false documents, and making false claims to U.S. citizenship.”48
LPRs are able to apply to become United States citizens through the
naturalization process.49 In general, most LPRs are eligible to apply for
citizenship after 5 years in LPR status; however, in some situations, the
waiting period is shorter.50 Similarly, an alien investor using an EB-5 visa
may naturalize and become a U.S. citizen 3 years after approval of the I829 petition.51 Citizenship requirements include physical presence in the
U.S., good moral character, and certain knowledge and literacy requirements,
which may be altered or waived in certain circumstances.52
There are several significant differences between LPR status and
citizenship.53 LPRs, for example, cannot vote in state or federal elections.54
In addition, U.S. citizens can file petitions for more categories of family
members, including married sons and daughters, parents, and siblings.55
Perhaps most significantly, U.S. citizens do not lose citizen status, even if
some of the circumstances that would lead to loss of LPR status are present.56
Consequently, conferral of citizenship status entails legally significant
implications, particularly with regard to prosecution.

46. Id. at § 245.
47. Id.
48. What Does It Mean to Be A Lawful Permanent Resident?, CLINICLEGAL.ORG, 1
available at https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/lpr.pdf; see also USCIS Policy Memorandum,
Adjudication of Eb-5 Regional Center Proposals and Affiliated Form I-526 and I-829
Petitions; Adjudicator’s Field Manual Update to Chapters 22.4 and 25.2 (AD09-38) (Dec.
11, 2009).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 8 C.F.R. § 216.
52. Id.
53. For a general explanation on naturalization, adjustment of status, and citizenship
consequences, see generally ALLAN WERNICK, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (2002).
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 611.
55. Id. at 87.
56. Id.
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III. HISTORY OF THE EB-5 PROGRAM THUS FAR
Despite the few requirements to qualify for an EB-5 visa, demand for
EB-5 visas has been limited and the Program has not obtained the desired
economic impact originally envisioned by Congress. From 1990 to 2010,
fewer than 10% of the available EB-5 visas were used.57 In an effort to
attract more alien investors and facilitate administrative convenience, CIS
has relaxed significantly or entirely eliminated most of the original EB-5
requirements and restrictions.58 These many changes in EB-5 law appear
to be successful in boosting EB-5 demand: use of the EB-5 visa grew
dramatically in the past three years.59 However, in making the EB-5 visa
much easier to obtain, Congress has sharply curtailed the amount of scrutiny
for both alien investors and the investments. In the wake of several EB-5
fraud scandals, which highlight the absence of oversight,60 these changes
in law appear problematic.
A. Legislative Intent Underlying the EB-5 Program
Creation of the EB-5 provision was intended both “to provide new
employment for U.S. workers and to infuse new capital into the
country. . . .”61 “Therefore, the creation of jobs for U.S. workers was a
critical element of the EB-5 Program.”62 In enacting the EB-5 Program,
Congress initially believed that the investor visa could substantially
bolster the economy, estimating that “as many as 4,000 foreign investors
and their families would seek U.S. lawful permanent residence (LPR or
“green card” status), bringing in fresh investment funds totaling an
estimated $4 billion and creating 40,000 jobs annually.”63 Other proponents
of the EB-5 Program claimed that the Program could attract up to eight
57. SONIA SUJANANI, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, & ROBERT C. DIVINE, A CUMULATIVE
ANALYSIS OF WHAT USCIS LOOKS FOR IN EB-5 I-829 RFES AND DENIALS, REGIONAL
CENTER. BUS. J. 7 (2013).
58. See 2013 EB-5 Adjudications Policy Memorandum, supra note 12, at 11, 19
(explaining the relaxation of previously enforced EB-5 requirements).
59. EB-5 filings have increased year-after-year for the past three years and, in FY
2012, the U.S. government issued over 7,400 EB-5 visas. See id. at 2.
60. See Section IV, infra.
61. S. REP. NO. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 21 (1989).
62. 2013 EB-5 Adjudications Policy Memorandum, supra note 12, at 15.
63. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EMPLOYMENT CREATION IMMIGRATION VISA (EB-5)
P ROGRAM R ECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
CIS_Ombudsman_EB-5_Recommendation_3_18_09.pdf.
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billion dollars annually in capital contributions and create 100,000 jobs
each year. 64 In Fiscal year 1993, CIS issued only 583 EB-5 visas.65
Additionally, until 2011, applications for EB-5 visas remained low.66
However, the elimination of several EB-5 requirements has coincided
with a surge in demand for EB-5 visas. In the 2012 Fiscal year, there were
6,200 EB-5 visa petitions filed, a dramatic increase from the 3,805 EB-5
petitions filed in 2011 and only 1,953 EB-5 visa petitions in 2010.67
Demand for EB-5 visas has steadily increased and from Fiscal year 2001
to Fiscal year 2015; “there ha[s] been a 1,250% increase in EB-5 visas”
issued over that period.68 In Fiscal year 2014, CIS issued 9,225 EB-5
visas. And within the first three months of Fiscal year 2014, 4,748 EB-5
visas were already been spoken for.69
Despite underwhelming results for the first 20 years that the Program
existed, Congress has extended the EB-5 visa scheme several times with
strong bipartisan support.70 Curiously, though the EB-5 Program has had

64. See Ashley Dunn, Lure of Visas Fails to Attract Rich Investors, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 1991, at A3.
65. March 2009 Ombudsman Report, supra note 11, at 7; see also CORA D. TEKACH,
IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990 TODAY: CURRENT STATE OF THE 1990 CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION LAW 155 (ed. 2004–2005).
66. See NUMBER OF I-526 IMMIGRANT PETITIONS BY ALIEN ENTREPRENEURS BY
FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, AND CASE STATUS 2008-2014, available at http://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms
%20Data/Employment-based/I526_performancedata_fy2014qtr2.pdf.
67. Id.
68. “Current Demand for EB-5 Visas Will Lead to Retrogression in FY-2015,
According to Department of State & Other Takeaways from Visa Update Panel” (Nov. 14,
2014) available at https://iiusa.org/blog/events/conferences/current-demand-eb5-visas- leadretrogression-fy2015-department-state-takeaways-visa-update-panel/.
69. Id.
70. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–119, 111 Stat. 2440 (1997); Act of October 30,
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-396, 114 Stat. 1637; 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107–273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002); Basic Pilot Program
Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–156, 117 Stat. 1944; Congress
enacted Section 610 of the Fiscal year 1993 Appropriations Act for the Justice Department.
Act of October 6, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–395, 106 Stat. 1828; The Basic Pilot Program
Extension and Expansion Act of 2003 extended the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Regional
Center Pilot Program for five years, until September 30, 2008. See Basic Pilot Program
Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, 117 Stat. 1944; The Fiscal
2009 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, H.R. 1105, extended the Program to September 30,
2009. Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–8, 123 Stat. 524. The 2012 (and
most recent) re-authorization of the Program through 2015 struck “pilot” from the statute when
referring to the EB-5 Regional Center Program. Act of September 28, 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-176, 126 Stat. 1325.
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neither the impact nor the interest that Congress envisioned, legislative
support for the investor visa program has not wavered.71
B. Changes in EB-5 Law Since Enactment
In an effort to increase use of the EB-5 category, several subsequent
changes to EB-5 law, including interpretation of the statutory requirements
and changes in CIS adjudication policy, made it easier to obtain an EB-5
visa and gain LPR status. Significantly, each of the requirements was relaxed
in favor of approving applications for EB-5 visas and granting petitions to
remove conditional residency.
Section 610 of the Appropriations Act created the Immigrant Investor
Pilot Program (“Pilot Program”) on October 6, 1992, in an attempt to give
immigrant investors the option of qualifying for legal residence by
creating jobs indirectly.72 Section 610(a) of the Act provides that EB-5
visas will be allocated to aliens investing in “a [R]egional [C]enter in the
United States for the promotion of economic growth, including increased
export sales, improved regional productivity, job creation, and increased
domestic capital investment.”73 “The requirements for an investor under
the Pilot Program are almost identical to the basic EB-5 Investor Program,
except that the Pilot Program provides for investments affiliated with a
Regional Center.74 The INS indicated that “Regional Centers” include
state government agencies as well as private entities.75 As a result, there
is currently no requirement of direct investment to qualify for an EB-5
visa. Consequently, an alien investor who is investing money through a
Regional Center is not required to consider, much less actually create, 10
full-time jobs.
One of the most significant relaxations of EB-5 requirements has been
the subsequent announcement of statutory interpretation. A policy
memorandum released by CIS on May 30, 2013 resolved some of the
71. The legislation that extended the Program was passed with unanimous support
in the Senate and by a 412-3 margin in the House of Representatives before being signed
into law by President Obama. See BILL SUMMARY AND STATUS, 112th Congress, S. 3245
(2011–2012).
72. See Act of October 6, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–395, 106 Stat. 1828.
73. Id.
74. The Immigrant Investor Pilot Program (“Pilot Program”) was created by Section
610 of Public Law 102–395 (Oct. 6, 1992).
75. See INS Implements New Pilot Program for Immigrant Investors, 70 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1129, 1130 (Aug. 30, 1993).
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ambiguity with regard to acceptable Regional Centers.76 In addition to
clarifying that adjudications are to be based upon a preponderance of the
evidence standard, the policy memorandum established that CIS examiners
should give deference to previous determinations. 77 Following the
memorandum, a Regional Center is no longer restricted to a particular
industry code, economic methodology, or geographic area. 78 The
memorandum provides minimal guidance for determining acceptable
Regional Center geography, stating only “the proposed area is contributing
significantly to the supply chain, as well as the labor pool, of the proposed
project.”79 Further, the memorandum eliminates the previous requirement
that the proposed economic activity “will substantially promote economic
growth in the proposed area as a whole.”80 Consequently, CIS has recently
adopted a position that significantly expands the number of regions
available for interested alien entrepreneurs to invest in, while broadening
the boundaries originally created by Congress in implementing the EB-5
Program. In addition, Section 610(c) of the Appropriations Act expressly
relaxes the job creation requirement currently set forth in 8 C.F.R. Section
204.6, because it allows aliens investing in new commercial enterprises
located within Regional Centers to establish mere ‘reasonable methodologies’
for determining the number of jobs created.81 As such, Section 610(c)
provides alien investors with tremendous leeway in demonstrating that
they have satisfied the job creation requirements of the Pilot Program. 82
In 2002, Congress passed provisions that gave several hundred
investors an opportunity to reestablish eligibility for the EB-5 Program.83
Under the 2002 provisions, investors who were able to satisfy the original,
pre-1998 requirements were immediately granted LPR status and investors
who had not met the original requirements were given an additional two
years to be able to demonstrate the requisite investment and job creation.84

76. 2013 EB-5 Adjudications Policy Memorandum, supra note 12.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id. at 13–15.
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id. at 17. Whereas Regional Centers were previously required to prove that the
proposed project (to serve as the basis for EB-5 visas) would substantially promote
economic growth in the proposed area as a whole, the May 2013 Policy Memorandum
indicated that this former requirement could be satisfied without providing any evidence,
but instead by mere showing that the surrounding area will contribute to the proposed
project. Id. at 14.
81. Immigrant Investor Pilot Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 17920, 17921 (Apr. 15, 1994).
82. Id.
83. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107–273, §§ 11031–37, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).
84. Id.
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On January 18, 2005, CIS issued a memorandum entitled “Extension of
Status for Conditional Residents with Pending or Denied Form I-829” to
issue guidance for adjudicating I-829 petitions.85 That memorandum
provided “. . . for those cases where the Form I-829 has not already been
adjudicated, an initial determination be made on an eligible alien’s
petition.”86 According to CIS guidance,
if the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that the alien has met the job
creation and capital investment requirements outlined by this law, and that there
is no material misrepresentation with respect to the Form I-829, the Secretary
must notify the alien and remove the conditional basis of the alien’s status, as
well as that of the alien’s spouse and children if their status was obtained under
Section 216A of the Act. 87

As such, only a cursory check for satisfaction of EB-5 requirements is
necessary to remove conditional residency. Despite growing national
security concerns over foreign companies investing in the United States,
no inquiry is made into whether a foreign investor has committed any
crimes or has been flagged for national security reasons.
In addition, CIS policy for adjudicating I-829 petitions has made clear
that the original EB-5 requirements created by Congress are, in practice,
flexible.88 The I-829 petition is intended to examine whether the alien
entrepreneur has satisfied the conditions of his admission to the United
States.89 Primarily, CIS is determining whether the alien has invested the
requisite capital and created the requisite jobs through that investment.90 CIS
regulations provide that a petitioner must demonstrate that “the alien has
created or can be expected to create within a reasonable period of time”
the required jobs in order to remove conditional residence.91 “For
purposes of the Form I-526 adjudication and the job creation requirements,

85. USCIS Inter-Office Memorandum, Extension of Status for Conditional Residents
with Pending or Denied Form I-829, Petitions Subject to Public Law 107–273 (Jan. 18,
2005).
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id.
88. See 2013 EB-5 Adjudications Policy Memorandum, supra note 12, at 22 (explaining
that so long as an investor is in “substantial compliance” with the investment and jobcreation requirements, conditional residency will be removed).
89. Id. at 6.
90. “At the Form I-829 stage, USCIS will require evidence verifying that the
escrowed funds were released and that the investment was sustained in the new commercial
enterprise.” Id.
91. 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1)(iv) (2009).
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the two year period described in 8 C.F.R. Section 204.6(j)(4)(i)(B) will be
deemed to have commenced six months after the adjudication of the Form
I-526.”92 CIS also has determined that both indirect and construction jobs
now also qualify as permanent jobs for satisfying EB-5 requirements.93
Moreover, the CIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual (“AFM”) provides that
“there may be some flexibility with respect to the timing of job creation
at the Form I-829 . . . stage.”94 In other words, an investment’s failure to
produce 10 full-time jobs within two years does not necessarily result in
an alien investor’s conditional residency status being revoked. Adopting
a flexible approach, CIS policy now provides that Form I-829 must
contain evidence that the petitioning alien “has created or can be expected to
create within a reasonable time ten full-time jobs for qualifying employees.”95
CIS policy further explains that an alien investor’s Form I-829 should be
approved (and conditional residency should end) “if, after considering the
evidence, the officer determines that the jobs are merely ‘more likely than
not’ going to be created within a reasonable time.”96
The May 2013 Policy Memorandum also provides that multiple alien
investors seeking EB-5 visas can pool their resources and invest in a single
project together. 97 The only requirement is that each alien investor
independently invests the minimum amount and that at least ten full-time
jobs per alien investor are created.98 The total number of full-time positions
created for qualifying employees shall be allocated solely to those alien
entrepreneurs who have used the establishment of the new commercial

92. 2013 EB-5 Adjudications Policy Memorandum, supra note 12, at 19.
93. Id.
94. Id. “Recognizing that circumstances may change after an alien secures admission
to the United States, CIS chose to implement INA section 216A with some ‘flexibility.’”
USCIS Policy Memorandum HQDOMO 70/6.1.8, “EB-5 Alien Entrepreneurs–Job
Creation and Full-Time Positions (AFM Update AD 09-04),” at 6 (June 17, 2009) [hereinafter
EB-5 Alien Entrepreneurs] available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/
Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/eb5_17jun09.pdf; see also Conditional
Permanent Resident Regulations for Alien Entrepreneurs, Spouses, and Children, 59 Fed.
Reg. 94-12524 (May 23, 1994).
95. 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(a)(4)(iv); In making the “reasonable time” determination,
USCIS should consider the evidence submitted along with the petition that demonstrates
when the jobs are expected to be created, the reasons that the jobs were not created as
predicted in Form I-526, the nature of the industry or industries in which the jobs are to be
created, and any other evidence submitted by the petitioner. EB-5 Alien Entrepreneurs, supra
note 94, at 6.
96. “American Immigration Lawyers Association EB-5 Committee and Invest In the
USA,” IIUSA (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/outreach/notes-previousengagements/american-immigration-lawyers-association-eb-5-committee-and-invest-usa-iiusa;
see also EB-5 Alien Entrepreneurs, supra note 94.
97. 2013 EB-5 Policy Adjudications Memorandum, supra note 12, at 20.
98. Id.
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enterprise as the basis of a petition on Form I-526.99 CIS must recognize
any reasonable agreement made among the alien entrepreneurs in regard
to the identification and allocation of such qualifying positions. Provided the
allocation of jobs does not conflict with a prior agreement made by the alien
investors, there is, apparently, no problem with allocating jobs created
between multiple investors.100
Consequently, CIS has relaxed or eliminated nearly every original
requirement of the EB-5 Program. Whereas EB-5 investors were initially
required to have their applications adjudicated by CIS, now EB-5 investors
have the option of selecting a Regional Center to apply through. While
the original requirements demanded that an investor demonstrate that his
or her active investment created at least 10 direct jobs, current policies
allow for indirect jobs to count toward job creation. CIS also has indicated
that the 10 jobs do not need to be created within the original two-year
period; instead, investors will be deemed to have satisfied the requirements if
it looks “likely” that jobs are expected to be created “within a reasonable
time.” As a result, proof of investment or job creation is not currently
required to remove conditional residency. Further, the creation of the
Regional Center program eliminated the “active investor” requirement.
Now, CIS allows for pooled investments and for EB-5 visa-holders to
delegate among themselves how job creation will be allocated. The one
constant in EB-5 requirements after nearly twenty-five years is the minimum
investment amount. In eliminating the original requirements of the EB-5
visa, these changes have made it easier for investors to not only obtain
LPR status (and, thereby, citizenship), but also to do so without the normal
oversight allocated to visas.
Unsurprisingly, the elimination of most EB-5 requirements has coincided
with a surge in the number of applications.101 Additionally, like application
rates, approval rates of I-526 and I-829 forms have increased.102 Approval
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., “Current Demand for EB-5 Visas Will Lead to Retrogression in FY2015, According to Department of State & Other Takeaways from Visa Update Panel,”
supra note 68.
102. See IIUSA Obtains I-526/829/924 Adjudication Data for FY2013, Releases
Comprehensive Dataset (1991–2013), INVESTMENT IN THE USA BLOG, (Jan. 13, 2014),
available at http://iiusablog.org/government-affairs/iiusa-obtains-i526829924-adjudicationdata-fy2013-releases-comprehensive-dataset-19912013/. “The I-829 approval rate over
the last six years (FY2008–2013) averages out to 87.1%, much higher than the 73.2% over
the entire span of the Program’s existence.” Id. “Over the last three years (FY2011–2013),
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rates for I-526s and I-829s remained fairly high in the 2012 fiscal year,
although slightly below the fiscal year 2011 average (79% approval
percentage for I-526s in fiscal year 2012 compared to 81% in fiscal year
2011, and 94% for I-924s in fiscal year 2012 compared to 96% in fiscal
year 2011).103 This shows some continued drop-off in approval rates for
I-526 initial petitions from previous years, while approval rates for the
second-step removal of conditions have improved.104 During fiscal year
2010, 89% of the initial individual EB-5 Immigrant Petitions for Alien
Entrepreneur (Form I-526) were approved; 80% of the subsequent Petitions
to Remove Conditions (Form I-829) were approved.105
C. The Surge in Demand for EB-5 Has Been Accompanied
By Fraud Scandals
The elimination of several EB-5 requirements allows alien investors to
gain EB-5 visas without providing very much information. The I-526
form requires basic information about the prospective investment, but
does not require that CIS inspect the investment project’s potential prior
to approving an EB-5 visa.106 Not surprisingly, several instances of fraud
have emerged.
On October 1, 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) and CIS issued a joint investor alert warning of potential scams
targeting foreign nationals wishing to immigrate to the United States
through the EB-5 Program.107 “The alert noted that the mere designation
I–526 approval rates have hovered right around 80%; while the I-829 approval rate has
eclipsed 90% in each of those years.” Id.
103. Office of Performance and Quality, Data Analysis and Reporting Branch, Immigrant
Petition by Alien Entrepreneur (I-526) and Petition by Entrepreneur to Remove Conditions (I–
829) Service-wide Receipts, Approvals, Denials Fiscal year(s): 2005–2012 (Third Quarter), U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.
uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/Upcoming
%20National%20Engagement%20Pages/2012%20Events/July%202012/EB5_Statistics_Q3
_2012.pdf.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. See FORM I-526, supra note 32.
107. Ana Campoy, SEC Case Shows Greater Scrutiny of EB-5 Programs, WALL ST.
J., October 18, 2013, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/S B100014240527023045
00404 579129690408822088. The alert alleged that a married couple fraudulently
promised to invest the money of alien investors, but instead diverted those funds for
personal use. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Halts Texas-Based Scheme
Targeting Foreign Investors Seeking U.S. Residency Through EB-5 Visa Program, (Oct. 1,
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/13705398547
31#.U- EH7PldXnE. “According to the SEC’s complaint, beginning in 2010, the Ramirezes
sought approval from USCIS to register USA Now as an EB-5 Regional Center that would
accept and direct investments from foreign investors into investment opportunities that
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of a business as a Regional Center by CIS does not mean any of its
investments have been approved by a government agency. The alert cites
cases in which Regional Centers have falsely promised investors a
specified return on their investment and misused investors’ money for
personal expenses.”108
Allegations of fraud surrounding EB-5 visas also emerged in South
Dakota when “Northern Beef Packers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
July with a plan to sell its assets, after suspending operations at its South
Dakota meat packing plant. The 420,000-square-foot plant in Aberdeen
opened in October 2012, and executives said in January 2013 that it had
raised $150 million in financing.”109 Much of this funding came from EB5 visas, as Northern Beef Packers was one of several South Dakota
Regional Center (“SDRC”) loan projects.110 Northern Beef Packers began
laying off workers, defaulted on its loan in March 2013, and then sold its
assets for $44.3 million in December 2013.111
Joop Bollen, president of Aberdeen, South Dakota-based SDRC, is a defendant
in a civil case filed in federal court in Sioux Falls, South Dakota in October. It
claims he provided ‘inaccurate and incomplete information’ to Chinese citizens
who put $500,000 each into the Northern Beef Packers cattle processing plant in
Aberdeen in 2009 and 2010. He failed to disclose there were liens against the
plant and that it was then about two years behind schedule, according to the
suit.112

In January 2014, Rep. Stace Nelson (R-19/Fulton) proposed a new bill to
ban the EB-5 Program in South Dakota.113
would purportedly satisfy the EB-5 visa requirements. But even before USCIS decided, the
Ramirezes and other USA Now employees already had started soliciting investors with
false promises about how their money would be invested.” Id.
108. LexisNexis Legal Newsroom Staff, News Excerpts From the Nov. 1, 2013 Bender’s
Immigration Bulletin, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM IMMIGRATION LAW (Oct. 21, 2013),
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/immigration-lawblog/archive/ 2013/10/21/excerpts-from-the-nov-1-2013-bender-s-immigration- bulletin.aspx.
109. Stephanie Gleason, Northern Beef to Be Sold to White Oak for $44.3 Million,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2013, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/S B1000142405270
2303497804 579242333031677004.
110. See Current Model: SDRC Loan Projects, S. D. REG’L CTR., INC., available at
http://www.sdrc-eb5.com/?page_id=27 (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
111. Gleason, supra note 109.
112. Dune Lawrence, Coming to America Costs $500,000 With Job Plan Prone to
Failures, BLOOMBERG, March 22, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-03-23/coming-to-america-costs-500-000-with- job-plan-prone-to- failures.html.
113. H.B. 1176, 2014 Legis. Assemb., 89th Sess. (S.D. 2014), available at http://
legis.sd.gov/docs/legsession/2014/Bills/HB1176P.pdf. Terms of the bill included: “No
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The growing number of events and stories alleging EB-5 fraud indicate
that the relaxation of EB-5 requirements poses threats to both alien
investors’ ability to identify sham investments and CIS’s ability to ensure
that the investments on which a grant of citizenship is based actually are
creating jobs.
IV. THE EB-5 VISA PROGRAM, AS IT CURRENTLY STANDS,
APPEARS TO BE AT ODDS WITH CURRENT
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
Immigration law plays an important role in safeguarding national security,
serving as both a tool for controlling entry into the country and a means
of achieving the Presidential Administration’s policies. Indeed, enforcement
of immigration law is inextricably linked to the efficacy of American
national security.114 Further, the terms of and policies underlying immigration
law explicitly recognize the importance of national security and the key
position that immigration policy plays in maintaining national security,
imposing penalties, and legal consequences for national security threats
by non-citizens.115 With the many changes in national security law, policy,
and administration since the creation of the EB-5 Program and the
emergence of a cybersecurity threat, FDIs are a source of growing
governmental concerns and, as a result, subject to increasing scrutiny.
Even though the EB-5 Program involves foreign investments and potential
foreign control of American assets, the level of scrutiny applied to
transactions reviewed by CFIUS is not similarly allocated to inspect foreign
investors using the EB-5 Program. Particularly in light of several recent red
flags issued by CFIUS when reviewing large-scale foreign investments,
the prudence of continuing the EB-5 investor visa program, as it currently
stands, is questionable.

official or agency of the State of South Dakota nor any political subdivision of the state
may participate in, or enter into any contract or agreement associated with, the federal EB5 Immigrant Investor Program administered by the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services of the United States Department of Homeland Security.” Id. As of January 2015,
no other states have (or attempted to) ban the EB-5 Program.
114. See generally Donald Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration
in a Coordinated National Security Policy, 21 GEORGETOWN IMM. L. J. 383 (2007)
(discussing the link between immigration law and national security).
115. The INA provides that “the term ‘national security’ means the national defense,
foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.” INA, supra note 11, at 8
U.S.C. § 1189(d)(2) (2004).
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A. The National Security Landscape Has Changed Significantly Since
the EB-5 Visa Program Was Created in 1990
When Congress enacted the IMMACT, the United States’ top national
security priorities included deterrence of nuclear attacks and maintaining
technological superiority, especially in nuclear forces and the space program.116
The years immediately following the enactment of the Immigration Act
of 1990 were marked by attempts to strengthen the economy and effect
significant changes in immigration law.117 However, the national security
climate and America’s national security concerns have changed significantly
since the EB-5 Program was enacted—first shifting to focus on military
power and presently confronting the threats posed by cybersecurity and
countering intelligence threats.118
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, fundamentally altered
American national security, underscoring the inextricable link between
immigration and national security.119 The hijackers who perpetrated the
September 11th attacks entered the United States through “valid” visas.120
The 9/11 Commission Report revealed that slipshod visa screening permitted
most of the hijackers to enter the United States with fraudulent passports
and false statements on their visa applications,121 concluding that the authorities

116. GEORGE BUSH, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990–
1991, at 22–23, 93–97 (1990).
117. “Nineteen-ninety six was a watershed year for immigration law. In response to
the Oklahoma City bombing, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) was passed . . . expanding the grounds for deportation and narrowing the provisions
for discretionary relief.” ARTHUR L. RIZER, III, THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
IMMIGRATION LAW 64 (2012); Congress also passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which focused on the apprehension and
expeditious removal of undocumented immigrants. Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); The
AEDPA and the IIRIRA created the method by which terrorist aliens and others considered
national security threats can be detained and removed, signaling a change in the threats
perceived from tensions abroad to concrete dangers of terrorism faced domestically. See
generally id.; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
118. See Brian Katulis, 5 National Security Issues to Watch in 2015, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 31, 2014), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/12/31/5-nationalsecurity-issues-to-watch-in-2015/.
119. See generally Kerwin & Stock, supra note 114.
120. Farrah G. de Leon, Girding the Nation’s Armor: The Appropriate Use of Immigration
Law to Combat Terrorism, 3 REGENT J. INT’L L. 115, 116 (2005).
121. Id.
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could have intercepted as many as fifteen of the nineteen hijackers if
authorities had observed proper procedures.122
The September 11th terrorist attacks not only were the catalyst of longlasting American military engagements in the Middle East, but also ushered
in several of the most significant changes in national security law and
policy, including The PATRIOT Act,123 the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security,124 the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004,125 the President’s Surveillance Program, and the FISA
Amendments.126 These acts changed existing law in a number of areas,
including government surveillance of foreign nationals, information sharing
between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence agencies,
government access to personal and business records, and federal
prosecution of terrorism suspects under federal criminal law.127 Creation
of these laws also afforded the federal government greater ability to
combat and prevent perceived security threats, both domestically and abroad.
Similarly, immigration law changed following the September 11th attacks,
responding largely to concerns over admission into the country and the
ability to prosecute non-citizens. The USA PATRIOT Act and REAL ID
Act became law, making more substantive changes to the INA terrorism
provisions.128 The INA now not only mandates the removal of aliens who
engage in national security threats such as espionage, sabotage, the transfer
of restricted technology or information, and membership in Communist
or totalitarian parties, but also removal for what is called “terrorist
activity.” 129 Perhaps most significantly, the Department of Homeland
Security was created in 2003, incorporating the former Immigration and
Nationalization Services (“INS”) and 21 other federal agencies.130 “In one
122. Id.; N AT ’ L C OMM ’ N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS U PON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 384 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911
report.pdf.
123. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (amending numerous federal laws as well as creating new
ones).
124. See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat.
2135 (2002).
125. See generally Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108–458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
126. See generally Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, ch. 36, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801 (1978); see also FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat.
2436 (2008).
127. See PATRIOT Act, supra note 123, at Title II “Enhanced Surveillance Procedures.”
128. Id.; see also Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. 109–13, 119 Stat. 302 (2008).
129. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, ch. 12; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
130. Kerwin & Stock, supra note 114, at 388.
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fell swoop, the U.S. immigration function became a homeland security
concern. The creation of DHS represented the largest U.S. government
restructuring since World War II. . . .”131 Soon after assuming the role of
immigration enforcement and the duty to effectuate terrorism policy in the
United States, the Department of Homeland Security began using its
immigration power to fight domestic terrorism.132 Indeed, the dramatic
and rapid shift in national security priority to terrorism prevention is evident
in the Department of Homeland Security’s mandate and demonstrates the
federal government’s recognition of the link between effective national
security practices and immigration practices. It follows that a vital part of
the national security plan is immigration regulation to prevent terrorists
from entering the United States, in order to reduce America’s exposure to
subsequent terrorist attacks.133 Moreover, when individuals who wish to
do harm to the United States are found in the country, the ability to remove
or detain those individuals is critical from a national security perspective.134
B. Shift in Perceived Threats
Though the threat of terrorism has predominated in the national security
arena over the past decade, rapidly growing concern for cyber security
indicates a coming shift in defense priorities and tactics.135 Cyberspace,
an increasingly pervasive part of life, has revolutionized the way businesses,
communications, societies, and even governments function. Part and
parcel of the internet is sharing, which, in addition to facilitating openness,
creates another avenue of vulnerability. Cyber espionage and cyberattacks

131. Id.
132. RIZER, supra note 117, at 51.
133. Id. at 52.
134. Id.
135. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM (2012) (stating that
there was a “lessened threat from terrorist groups”); see NAT’L SECURITY STRATEGY
REPORT, supra note 10, at 27 (listing cyber security and countering intelligence threats as
security priorities, providing “cyber security threats represent one of the most serious
national security, public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation. . . Our daily
lives and public safety depend on power and electric grids, but potential adversaries could
use cyber vulnerabilities to disrupt them on a massive scale.”). In addition, the Office of
the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (S/CCI), which was established in February 2011, included
“reduc[ing] intrusions into and disruptions of US networks” in its policy outline. In July
2012, President Obama issued an op-ed addressing how the federal government was
“taking cyberattack threat seriously.” See Barack Obama, Taking the Cyberattack Threat
Seriously, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2012).
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present an increasing threat to both the U.S. economy and national security.
And despite fostering open markets and free trade, the United States also
seeks to safeguard national security. The growing number of transactions
by foreign companies flagged by CFIUS and questioned by Congress136
highlights the fact that these two interests are increasingly at odds.
1. The Growing Problem Presented By
Vulnerability in Cybersecurity
A growing challenge in ensuring national security is dealing with the
challenge of protecting cyber infrastructure. In 2003, the Department of
Homeland Security released the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,
underscoring the importance of “critical infrastructures.”137 Though many
of the critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated, securing
these networks is essential to American economic well-being and national
security.138 Recent technology trends—particularly the growth in mobile
technology, migration to cloud computing, and social networking—exacerbate
the challenge of ensuring cybersecurity.139
The seriousness of the threat posed by cyberattacks has grown
tremendously in the past few years. President Obama penned a Wall
Street Journal op-ed in August 2012 describing the cyberthreat as “one of
the most serious economic and national security challenges” facing our
nation.140 Six months later, President Obama again underscored the
importance of cybersecurity in his post-election, State of the Union
Address.141 “In March 2013, just one year after FBI Director Robert Mueller

136.
137.

See Cedarbaum & Preston, infra note 151.
U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, NAT’L STRATEGY TO SECURE
CYBERSPACE (Feb. 2003), available at https://www.us- cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
cyberspace_strategy.pdf (“Our nation’s critical infrastructures are composed of public and
private institutions in the sectors of agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services,
government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation,
banking, and finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal and shipping. Cyberspace
is their nervous system—the control system of our country. Thus, the healthy functioning of
cyberspace is essential to our economy and our national security.”).
138. Melanie J. Teplinsky, Fiddling on the Roof: Recent Developments in Cybersecurity,
2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 225, 233 (2013).
139. Id.
140. Obama, supra note 135.
141. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address
(signaling his intention to make cybersecurity a priority in his second term and to lay out
his plan for doing so, stating: “Earlier today, I signed a new executive order that will
strengthen our cyber defenses . . . But now Congress must act as well, by passing legislation
to give our government a greater capacity to secure our networks and deter attacks. This
is something we should be able to get done on a bipartisan basis.”).
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warned that cyberthreats were expected to surpass terrorism as the single
greatest threat to the United States, the U.S. Director of National
Intelligence identified cybersecurity as the top threat facing America. The
next day, President Obama invited select CEOs of critical infrastructure
companies directly to the White House to discuss cyberscurity, and a few
weeks later, in April 2013, he summoned 15 of America’s top financial
leaders to the White House to discuss . . . cyberrisks.”142
Despite investments in and efforts to ensure cybersecurity, America’s
digital assets and critical infrastructures continue to be targeted and exploited
by espionage.143 Large-scale cyber operations “uncovered during the
same time period include Red October,”144 an alleged Chinese cyberespionage
operation uncovered in October 2012, and a massive operation discovered
in early 2013 that targeted Apple, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, and an
estimated forty other companies.145
The shift in national security threats has necessitated not only the
adoption of new tools to combat such threats, but also a consideration of
vulnerable areas ripe for penetration.

142. Teplinsky, supra note 138, at 246; see also Frederick Kempe, Seeking to Avert
Cyberwar, REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2013), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/
2013/04/15/seeking-to-avert-cyber-war/. An executive who participated in the April meeting
explained: “[t]he President scared the hell out of all of us, and we’re not easy to frighten.”
Id.
143. Teplinsky, supra note 138, at 246. American targets of major cybersecurity
incidents over the past few years have included:
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (May 2010), Google (June 2010), RSA Security
(May 2011), Sony (May 2011; October 2012), Booz Allen Hamilton (July 2011),
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (September 2011), twentythree natural gas pipeline operators (December 2011–June 2012), Global Payments
(March 2012), numerous financial services companies and the New York Stock
Exchange (September 2012–March 2013), the White House (September 2012),
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (October 2012), major U.S. media
outlets—including the New York Times and Wall Street Journal (October 2012–
January 2013), the Alabama State Government (January 2013), the U.S.
Sentencing Commission (January 2013), the U.S. Probation Office for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Evernote (March 2013), and Reddit (April 2013).
Id.
144. See Teplinsky, supra note 138, at 246–48.
145. Id. at 247–49.
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Foreign Investment is Uniquely Implicated
By This Shift in Threats

In 2008, the CIA identified the then-ongoing economic crisis as the
“foremost current threat to national security.”146 Indeed, the value of
foreign entities’ acquisitions in the United States increased 93 percent
between 2006 and 2007, due largely to the dollar’s weak value at that time
and soaring revenues in China and oil-rich countries.147 “Foreign buyers
accounted for 46 percent of the $230.5 billion of U.S. mergers and
acquisitions in the fourth quarter of 2007,148 the largest percentage of
foreign buyers since 1998.”149 Though CFIUS has existed for almost 40
years,150 “controversial transactions since September 11th—most notably
the outcry over the initial approval of United Arab Emirates-based Dubai
Ports World’s acquisitions of a company operating marine terminals in a
number of major U.S. ports—have elevated CFIUS from relative obscurity
to the front pages.”151
In response to national security concerns surrounding the potential
problems of FDI,152 Congress enacted the Exon-Florio Amendment.153
The Exon-Florio Amendment authorizes the President to investigate
mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers by foreign persons or entities that
result in foreign control over a U.S. company or certain U.S. assets.154 The
Exon-Florio Amendment allows CFIUS (acting under Executive Branch
authority) to block a transaction when, after a review, CFIUS “finds

146. See Mark Mazzetti, Global Economic Crisis Poses Top Threat to U.S., Spy
Chief Warns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A14; see also Peter Boone & Simon Johnson,
The Next World War? It Could be Financial, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2008, at B1.
147. Jamie S. Gorelick, Stephen W. Preston, Jonathan G. Cedarbaum, The Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007: Navigating the New Regulations, ABA INT’L
LAW SECTION, 2 (Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://www.wilmerhale.de/files/publication/
0cea02a2-9b16-4fde-b5e7- 4337b0afbddb/ presentation/publicationattachment/c5250cf66c51-48ec-b84e-05482ae0f407/cfius.pdf (citing Ariana E. Cha, Weak Dollar Fuels China’s
Buying Spree of U.S. Firms, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2008, at A1).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1–2.
150. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971–1975).
151. Jonathon G. Cedarbaum & Stephen W. Preston, CFIUS and Foreign Investment,
HOMELAND SECURITY: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 235–36 (Joe D. Whitley & Lynne K.
Zusman eds., 2009).
152. “By the late 1980s, Congress and the public had grown increasingly concerned
about the sharp increase in foreign investment in the United States and the potential impact
such investment might have on the U.S. economy.” JACKSON, supra note 5, at 4; “In 1988,
amid concerns over foreign acquisition of certain types of U.S. firms, particularly by
Japanese firms, Congress approved the Exon-Florio provision.” Id. at 3.
153. 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (2007).
154. Id.
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credible evidence that a transaction would impair national security.”155
Because CFIUS review specifically focuses on the national security
ramifications of a transaction, initiation of CFIUS review is most likely
“. . . when the target U.S. company has classified contracts with the U.S.
government or provides products or services involving U.S. exportcontrolled technologies [. . .or. . .] operates or supplies U.S. critical
infrastructure, such as the telecommunications network.”156
The shift in national security concerns focused attention and efforts on
information-based threats, highlighting the need to carefully evaluate the
best methods of promoting economic growth raising questions about the
appropriate regulation of foreign investment.157
C. Recent Incidents Highlight the Tension Between Promoting
Foreign Involvement in the American Economy and
Safeguarding National Security
The growing number of mergers and acquisitions flagged by CFIUS
and the Treasury Department during the past five years demonstrates the
growing concern of the security implications that foreign investment
entails.
The Exon-Florio Amendment has received increased attention in the
past decade, due to an increase in the number of transactions reviewed by
CFIUS and a growing concern with the government’s ability to prevent
terrorism after September 11th.158 Exon-Florio clearance processes can
complicate and delay transactions, even when clearance is ultimately

155. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(d)(4). CFIUS’s ability to block a merger or acquisition
is only possible where the Executive Branch has no other explicit authority to stop a
transaction.
156. Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 151, at 240.
157. “The increasing investments in the United States by sovereign wealth funds—
large pools of investment capital controlled by foreign governments—have also raised
new questions in Congress and the executive branch about the regulation of foreign
investment.” Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 151, at 236 (As with investments by other
sorts of foreign investors, investments by sovereign wealth funds emanating from
countries such as China and the Gulf Arab states, with which the United States has important
strategic and geopolitical entanglements, have raised particular concerns.). For an overview
of sovereign wealth funds, see Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets,
87 FOREIGN AFF. 119, 119–30 (Jan./Feb. 2008); Asset-Backed Insecurity—SovereignWealth Funds, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, at 78–80.
158. Jeffrey L. Kessler & Spencer Weber Waller, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S.
ANTITRUST LAW § 12:14 (2d ed. 2006).

441

RYAN_ME_ADA (DO NOT DELETE)

10/7/2016 3:02 PM

provided.159 The clearance process is designed to last no more than 90
days, but the parties are often forced to withdraw and re-file their transaction
notifications, thereby restarting the process, under threat that the transaction
will otherwise be blocked.160 In addition, clearance is increasingly contingent
on parties making adjustments to the planned transactions in order to
obviate perceived security concerns.161
In 2003, Hong Kong-based company Hutchison Whampoa withdrew its
bid to acquire Global Crossing, a telecommunications company, after
encountering resistance from Exon-Florio review.162 After a lengthy review
and agreement on extensive network security measures, the President
approved Singapore Technology Telemedia’s acquisition of the U.S. firm.163
Bush Administration officials contended that the proposed transactions
would threaten national security, although the principal Global Crossing
asset at issue was a commercial telecommunications network.164
Two years later, Dubai Ports, a company owned by United Arab Emirates,
attempted “to acquire The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company (P&O), a British firm that operates in a number of U.S. ports
and other ports around the world.”165 After an initial approval of the
acquisition generated controversy and a request for additional CFIUS
review,166 Dubai Ports announced on March 9, 2006, that it would transfer
operations of American ports to a U.S. entity.167
Responding to these trends, Congress passed the Foreign Investment
and National Security Act (FINSA) in late 2007,168 which brought some

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.; See Dennis K. Berman, Bush is Expected to Approve Global Crossing Deal,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2003, at A2.
163. See Company News: Global Crossing Sale Clears One U.S. Hurdle, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 20, 2003, at C4; Kessler & Waller, supra note 158.
164. Berman, supra note 162; Kessler & Waller, supra note 158.
165. Kessler & Waller, supra note 158; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury
—Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., CFIUS and the Prot. of the Nat’l Sec. in the Dubai
Ports World Bid for Port Operations (Feb. 24, 2006), available at http://www.treas.
gov/press/releases/js4071.htm. [hereinafter CFIUS Protection]; Press Release, Office of
the White House Press Sec’y, The CFIUS Process and the DP World Transaction (Feb.
23, 2006), available at http://www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2006/02/20060222-11.html.
166. See CFIUS Protection, supra note 165; S. 2341, 109th Cong. §§ 12–13 (2006)
(enacted).
167. See Press Release, Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co., Sale of P&O
Ports in N. Am. (Mar. 15, 2006).
168. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–49,
121 Stat. 246.
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significant changes to the CFIUS program. 169 “Further clarification has
come in the Treasury Department’s revised CFIUS regulations, required
under FINSA, and effective as of December 22, 2008. Industry-specific
regimes managed by various departments and agencies have also continued
to develop alongside the CFIUS process.”170
A proposed acquisition of Firstgold, an American mining firm, by the
Chinese Northwest Non-Ferrous International Company Limited
(“Northwest”) was cancelled because of CFIUS concerns.171 On July 20,
2009, Firstgold announced a $26.5 million investment in the company by
Northwest, an entity controlled by the Shaanxi provincial government.172
Under the agreement between the two companies, Northwest would purchase
some of Firstgold’s secured debt while also taking a 51% stake in
Firstgold.173 On December 18, 2009, one month after CFIUS initiated a
review of the transaction, Firstgold announced that CFIUS intended to
reject the transaction.174 Apparently, CFIUS’s primary concern was the
proximity of four Firstgold mines to the Fallon Naval Air Station and the
existence of a possible threat to other sensitive and classified security and
military assets.175
In February 2011, Futurewei, the U.S. subsidiary of Huawei Technologies
Co., Ltd., a Chinese telecommunications equipment producer, bowed out
of a $2 million acquisition of patents from 3Leaf, an insolvent Californiabased startup, after CFIUS suggested that Huawei voluntarily divest the

169. Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 151, at 236–37. “FINSA required CFIUS to
conduct more investigations, guided those investigations by providing more detailed
congressional instruction about what to look for, authorized the Committee to impose
sanctions on foreign companies that failed to comply with CFIUS requirements, and
mandated that additional, extensive, and detailed reports be provided to Congress. By
codifying these requirements, FINSA formalized CFIUS’s role statutorily, whereas it had
previously been defined only by an executive order of the president.” David Zaring,
CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL L. REV. 81, 95–96 (2009).
170. Cedarbaum & Preston, supra note 151, at 237.
171. See Memorandum from Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP and Reed Smith LLP to
Nw. Non-Ferrous Int’l Co. Ltd. and Firstgold Corp., at 2–3 (Dec. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/images/nytint/docs/memo-regarding-the-sale-of
-firstgold-corp/original.pdf [hereinafter Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP Memo].
172. See Matthew C. Sullivan, Mining for Meaning: Assessing CFIUS’s Rejection of
the Firstgold Acquisition, 4 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUB. 12, 15 (2010).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP Memo, supra note 171, at 3; Sullivan, supra
note 175, at 16.
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3Leaf assets.176 The U.S. government had expressed concerns for Huawei
for a number of years because of the company’s close relationship with
the Chinese government and China’s security services.177 Though Huawei
never sought CFIUS approval of the transaction, a report from the House
Intelligence Committee flagged several security issues stemming from
Huawei acquisitions, including concerns of Chinese intelligence agencies
penetrating American telecommunications networks and industrial
espionage. 178
These blocked transactions reflect not only the increased role of CFIUS
in American national security protection, but also a growing concern for
a new type of intelligence threat that is location-sensitive.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EB-5 VISA PROGRAM THROW NATIONAL
SECURITY THREATS INTO SHARP RELIEF
The recent boom in the number of mergers and acquisitions flagged by
CFIUS as potential threats to national security is a pointed reminder of the
tension between promoting foreign involvement in the American economy
and safeguarding national security. And though high-profile transactions
have been subjected to scrutiny, the security implications of foreign
investment not accomplished through FDIs remains unclear. While the
responsibility of reviewing large-scale transactions with foreign companies
falls primarily to CFIUS, similar scrutiny is absent for investments made
for immigration purposes. Indeed, the recent CFIUS incidents raise more
questions than they answer with respect to the EB-5 Program. Against
the current national security landscape, foreign investment through the
EB-5 Visa Program appears problematic, not least because it also entails
the promise of citizenship.

176. See, e.g., Chris V. Nicholson, The Big Chill: Huawei Imbroglio Puts Countries
at Odds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2011, 4:49 AM), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2011/02/18/the-big-chill-huawei-imbroglio-puts-countries-at-odds/?r=1; Sinead Carew &
Jessica Wohl, Huawei Backs Away from 3Leaf Acquisition, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2011, 2:02
PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/19/us-huawei-3leaf-idUSTRE
71I38920110219.
177. Carew & Wohl, supra note 176.
178. “The National Security Implications of Investments and Products from the
People’s Republic of China in the Telecommunications Sector,” U.S. China Economic and
Security Review Commission Staff Report, January 2011, p. 16, 20, available at http://
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/FINALREPORT_TheNationalSecurityImplication
sofInvestmentsandProductsfromThePRCintheTelecommunicationsSector.pdf.
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A. CFIUS Procedures in Assessing EB-5 Investments Present A Stark
Contrast to the Stringent CFIUS Review of Foreign Direct
Investments, Though There Appears to Be No Way to
Meaningfully Distinguish the Discrepancies in
Scrutiny Levels
Though FDIs and investments completed through the EB-5 Program
share several striking similarities (including control of American businesses
by non-citizens and potential national security threats), the stringent CFIUS
scrutiny of FDIs is markedly different from the striking absence of oversight
over the EB-5 process.
CFIUS consists of the heads of nine separate federal agencies: the State
Department, Treasury Department, Department of Defense, Department
of Homeland Security, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy,
the Department of Justice, the Office of the United States Trade Representative,
and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.179 “According to the
amended Exon-Florio provision, the President or any member of CFIUS
can initiate a review of an investment transaction in addition to a review
that is initiated by the parties to a transaction providing a formal
notification.” 180 CFIUS then has 30 days to review a transaction and
determine if action is needed.181
The Exon-Florio provision includes a list of 12 factors the President
must consider in deciding to block a foreign acquisition:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

179.
180.
181.

domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements;
the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies and services;
the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign
citizens as it affects and capability and capacity of the U.S to meet the
requirements of national security;
the potential effects of the transactions on the sales of military goods,
equipment, or technology to a country that supports terrorism or proliferates
missile technology or chemical or biological weapons; and transactions
identified by the Secretary of Defense as “posing a regional military threat”
to the interests of the United States. These factors are also considered

JACKSON, supra note 5, at 11.
Id. at 16.
Id.
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by the individual members of CFIUS as part of their own review process
to determine if a particular transaction threatens to impair the national
security;
(5) the potential effects of the transaction on U.S. technological leadership in
areas affecting U.S. national security;
(6) whether the transaction has a security-related impact on critical
infrastructure in the United States;
(7) the potential effects on United States critical infrastructure, including
major energy assets;
(8) the potential effects on United States critical technologies;
(9) whether the transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction;
(10) in those cases involving a government-controlled transaction, a review of
(A) the adherence of the foreign country to nonproliferation
control regimes,
(B) the foreign country’s record of cooperating in counterterrorism efforts,
(C) the potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies
with military applications;
(11) the long-term projection of the United States requirements for sources
of energy and other critical resources and materials; and
(12) such other factors as the President or the Committee determine to be
appropriate.182

As such, CFIUS is required to consider the impact of an investment on
critical infrastructure and the national security ramifications as key factors
for blocking or postponing a transaction.183 Review is terminated (and the
FDI in question is allowed to continue) if CFIUS concludes that the
investment does not threaten national security.184 However, if one or more
of the agencies participating in CFIUS review decides that an investment
poses a national security risk, CFIUS initiates a 45-day investigation of
the investment and the investor.185
This stringent process, which involves several agencies and takes into
consideration both short term threats and potential for long-term problems,
highlights the absence of similar concerns with regard to EB-5 visas,

182. Id. at 18.
183. See id. “The Director of National Intelligence is required to carry out a thorough
analysis of ‘any threat to the national security of the United States’ posed by the merger,
acquisition, or takeover being reviewed. In addition, the Director of National Intelligence
is required to seek and to incorporate the views of ‘all affected or appropriate’ intelligence
agencies.” Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.

446

RYAN_ME_ADA (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 16: 417, 2015]

10/7/2016 3:02 PM

Too Porous for Protection?
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

which, by contrast require minimal documentation and are automatically
approved if its minimal requirements are met.186
Moreover, the absence of scrutiny for EB-5 visas is inconsistent with
the approval process for others visas. Many visas require background
checks to be conducted—and cleared—prior to approval of the visa.187
These background checks include biometric-based and biographic-based
inquiries.188 If the background check results are cause for law enforcement
or national security concern, CIS may then work with law enforcement
agencies “to determine whether law enforcement actions should be
pursued.”189 However, as CIS has progressively and consistently relaxed
the EB-5 requirements, less documentation is required to qualify for the
visa (and, thereby, LPR status). Consequently, the lack of application
information cannot be cured by oversight throughout the investment
process before conditional residency is removed. The EB-5 application
process does not contain sufficient information or oversight to ensure that
the job creation requirement is met, as demonstrated by recent fraud
scandals. And because the forms for obtaining an EB-5 visa are three
pages in length and limited to information about the prospective investments,
not enough information is provided to allow federal agencies to screen for
potential national security threats and existing CIS background checks for
EB-5 visas appear insufficient to ensure that applicants do not pose a
national security threat. More troubling still is that the EB-5 visa application
and approval process lacks sufficient information to conduct even the
background checks that are routine for visa approvals.
Perhaps an even larger problem with respect to background checks is
posed by the allowance of EB-5 investments through Regional Centers.
Regional Centers are business entities (often private) that coordinate
foreign investment within a particular geographic area. While regulations
186. See I-526 Instructions, supra note 38 (indicating that an alien investor is granted
an EB-5 visa and conditional residence provided the I-526 form is satisfactorily filled out).
187. “Title 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. requires background checks to be conducted
for . . . many visas. . .” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
FOR THE IMMIGRATION BENEFITS BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEMS, 1 (2010), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary /assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ uscis_ibbcs.pdf.
188. The four background checks normally required are: the FBI Fingerprint Check,
the US-VISIT’s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) Fingerprint Check,
the FBI Name Check, and TECS Name Check. Id. at 2.
189. Id. “. . . CIS may work with DHS Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), the FBI,
or other law enforcement entitites, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).”
Id.
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require that each Regional Center must “demonstrate in verifiable detail
how jobs will be created” and “commit sufficient funds to promote and
oversee capital investment opportunities,”190 there are no official policies
or guidelines regarding background checks of investors using Regional
Centers. Current EB-5 law requires Regional Centers to confirm merely
that prospective investors will be able to invest the required amount. An
alien investor utilizing a Regional Center is subjected to only a basic due
diligence inquiry in his or her process to acquire citizenship. 191
Consequently, even if a Regional Center were to request background
information from an investor, that Regional Center’s ability to verify
information would be sharply limited, as it would lack access to federal
agency databases. Further, by allowing potential investors to invest through
a regional center and file an application directly through a Regional
Center, CIS’s ability to conduct background check or exercise oversight
over those applying for LPR status is severely curtailed.
The EB-5 Visa Program—and the Regional Center Program, in particular
—thus allows alien investors to obtain status without being subject to the
routine background inquiries required for both foreign investment and the
majority of immigration visas. Consequently, the EB-5 Visa Program’s
application system—and, therefore, security measures—have several
information loopholes.
The discrepancies in policies and practices between CFIUS and the EB5 Program highlight an inconsistency in the treatment of foreign investment.
However, there has been no proffered explanation to reconcile the
different levels of scrutiny. It is unclear how to differentiate the threat
posed by foreign investment into the American economy from the threat
posed by foreign investors investing money in the United States to obtain
citizenship. Neither the size of the group making an investment nor the
total amount invested appears to be dispositive. Moreover, there appears
to be no way to highlight sensitive locations under the EB-5 review, as
CIS only requires 10 jobs and does not impose limitations for sensitive
locations or industries. Though many of the mergers and acquisitions
blocked by CFIUS were being sought by Chinese companies with close
ties to the Chinese government,192 neither close association to a hostile
foreign government nor a highly regulated field (such as aviation or

190. See 2013 EB-5 Adjudications Policy, supra note 12, at 13.
191. An alien investor’s due diligence efforts are limited to ensuring he or she can
invest the required amount and investing in an enterprise likely to create jobs. The second
step is guaranteed to be satisfied where the enterprise has been pre-approved, as is the case
with every Regional Center. See generally 2013 EB-5 Adjudications Policy Memorandum,
supra note 12.
192. See Section IV, Subsection B 2, supra.
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energy) appears to be dispositive for CFIUS rejection.193 As a result, there
does not appear to be a way to meaningfully distinguish the potential
threat posed by FDIs and the foreign investments used as a basis for an
EB-5 visa.
Though Congress created the EB-5 Visa Program to bolster the American
economy, the relaxation of the original EB-5 requirements and absence of
background checks for the investors appear at odds with the increased
scrutiny to which both foreign investments and visa applicants are subjected.
Moreover, the limited economic success of the EB-5 Program and several
recent EB-5 scandals involving fraud call the prudence of continuing to
offer the foreign investor visa, as it currently stands, into question.
B. The Lack of Information for the EB-5 Program is Troubling,
Considering the Nature of Current Threats
The intense and detailed reviews conducted by CFIUS throw the
shortcomings of the EB-5 Program, most notably the lack of any similar
background checks, into focus. Conspicuously absent are any inquiries
into criminal convictions, much less any inquiry into troubling connections
that possibly pose security threats. Perhaps more troubling still is that,
absent adequate review, the EB-5 visa can serve as a route around CFIUS
scrutiny, effectively sidestepping inquiries into security threats and
simultaneously granting citizenship status. This is particularly worrisome,
considering the complex nature of the threat posed by cyberattacks––just
one type of threat that CFIUS screens for––and the recent surge in EB-5
applications.194

193. See generally Fred M. Greguras, Michael J. O'Neil & Chenhao Zhu, M&A in
the United States: What Chinese Companies Need to Know about Exon-Florio Review in
the Clean Technology and Other Business Sectors, THE FLETCHER SCHOOL, TUFTS UNIV.
(April 2012), available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/swfi/pdfs/
2012/Updated_Exon-Florio.pdf. For instance, a more positive result was obtained by the
China Aviation Industry General Aircraft Co., Ltd. (“CAIGA”) from its March 2011 acquisition
of Cirrus Industries, Inc. (a Minnesota-based manufacturer of small aircraft). While CAIGA is
a wholly owned subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, a Chinese
government-owned entity, and CAIGA was acquiring an aircraft manufacturer, CAIGA
nonetheless was able to close its acquisition without any serious impediment from CFIUS.
Id. at 2.
194. See, e.g., “Current Demand for EB-5 Visas Will Lead to Retrogression in FY2015, According to Department of State & Other Takeaways from Visa Update Panel,”
supra note 68.
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On December 12, 2013, Senator Charles E. Grassley wrote an open
letter to John Sandweg, the Acting Director of U.S. Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement, asking questions about the EB-5 Visa Program and
making public a Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) internal memo
that was leaked.195 The memo is from HSI, the investigative branch of
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement and America’s second largest
investigatory agency after the FBI, and “appears to have been written in
response to a request from then-Secretary Janet Napolitano as part of an
investigation of Iranian operatives with known connections to terrorist
groups.”196 In the memo, HSI expressed concerns that the EB-5 investor
visa program could be abused by foreign operatives as a means to infiltrate
the United States.197 The memo describes the HSI investigation of a
known Iranian operative involved in a procurement network that exports
items, particularly sensitive electronics, to Iran for use by “secret Iranian
government agencies” involved in a series of international assassination
and terrorism operations.198 That particular operative was employed by a
participant in the EB-5 Visa Program.199 Additionally, the memo identified
seven main areas of vulnerability with the EB-5 Visa Program:
(1) export of sensitive technology/economic espionage; (2) use by foreign government
agents/espionage; (3) use by terrorists; (4) investment fraud by Regional Center;
(5) investment fraud by investors; (6) fraud conspiracies by investors and
Regional Center; and (7) illicit finance/money laundering.200

The memo, though heavily redacted, confirms that the EB-5 Program
has the potential to be (and is actually being) used to sidestep the routine
security checks required to obtain other visas. The memo underscores the
problematic lack of information with EB-5 visas—both at the time of initial
application and following approval. Most notably, the memo demonstrates
that the EB-5 Program has no mechanism for recognizing individuals
known to the intelligence community and are known to be potential

195. Letter from Charles Grassley, U.S. Senator, to John Sandweg, Acting Director
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Grassley Letter],
available at http://www. grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/internal-memo-outlinesnational-security-concerns-eb-5-immigration-program. U.S. Senator Charles E. Grassley
(R-Iowa), ranking member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, sent a letter to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director, John Sandweg, expressing concerns with
the security of the EB-5 Regional Center program following a memorandum from Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI) addressing questions from then-Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet Napolitano. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Id.
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security threats, much less a process for referring those individuals for
additional oversight or scrutiny prior to visa approval. Indeed, despite the
existence of the Visa Security Program (“VSP”), which examines visa
applications for fraud and initiates investigations of suspected terrorist
suspects,201 the VSP does not provide additional security to the EB-5
Program, as the EB-5 application process lacks a mechanism to, first, flag
problematic individuals and then refer those individuals to additional
oversight. Consequently, EB-5 applications cannot be referred to VSP or
another similar security-based agency because there is insufficient
background information provided in an EB-5 application to alert CIS of
potential security issues.
Given the legal significance attached to adjustment of status from LPR
to U.S. citizen and the number of recent national security threats flagged
by CFIUS, it is surprising that there are so few background reviews of
alien investors. In the approval processes for I-526 and I-829 forms, there
are no criminal checks and no inquiries into investors’ unfavorable ties.202
Further, the relaxation of several basic requirements has not only made it
easier to qualify for an EB-5 visa, but has also effectively dispensed of
any scrutiny that may have taken place during the approval process.203
Unsurprisingly, this relaxation of requirements has been coupled with a
surge in EB-5 visa applications and approvals.204 But worryingly, the EB5 Program appears to be being used by some as a way to evade scrutiny,
as the amount of background information required to obtain an EB-5 visa
is minimal.205
Because there does not appear to be a way to meaningfully distinguish
between FDIs subjected to CFIUS review and investments through the
EB-5 Program used to obtain American citizenship, additional oversight

201. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/ICE/PIA-011(A), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
FOR THE VISA SECURITY PROGRAM TRACKING SYSTEM-NETWORK VERSION 2.0, at 2-4 (Jan.
17, 2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/
privacy_pia-ice_vspts%20net%202%200_20130117.pdf.
202. For explanation of the qualification process for an alien to obtain an EB-5 visa,
see generally I-526 Instructions, supra note 38 and Instructions for I-829, Petition by
Entrepreneur to Remove Conditions available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
files/form/i-829instr.pdf [hereinafter I-829 Instructions].
203. See IIUSA, supra note 96.
204. See, e.g., “Current Demand for EB-5 Visas Will Lead to Retrogression in FY2015, According to Department of State & Other Takeaways from Visa Update Panel,”
supra note 68.
205. See Grassley Letter, supra note 195.
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and deeper inquiries of EB-5 applications are needed to ensure that
prospective EB-5 investors do not pose threats to national security.
Though the magnitude and potential ramifications of the EB-5 Program’s
shortcomings are still unknown, the absence of a meaningful, backgroundchecking mechanism allows the EB-5 Program to serve as a route around
other established channels of scrutiny, as is demonstrated by the investigation
described in the leaked HSI memo. As such, the economic benefits of
offering foreign investor visas may be far outweighed by the national security
costs of continuing the EB-5 Program.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REMEDYING SEVERAL EB-5
SHORTCOMINGS
In light of the leaked HSI memo, the EB-5 Program appears to be both
inconsistent with the national security policies underlying CFIUS scrutiny
and a very real frontier for evading routine security checks. Because the
EB-5 visa process has serious shortcomings, implementing several
changes to the basic operation of the approval process is necessary to
reduce the security risk posed by the program.
A key change is that the Regional Center program should sunset (that
is, Congress should allow the statutory provision expire), as there appear
to be no safeguards that can be put in place that will reasonably ensure the
integrity of the Regional Center model. Indeed, recent EB-5 fraud incidents
demonstrate an absence of oversight concerning both EB-5 investors and
investments in Regional Centers.206 Because the Regional Center program
delegates security checks to the private company running each respective
Regional Center, other attempts to bolster security of EB-5 visas (such as
changing the application forms to include more questions on investors’
backgrounds) would likely be meaningless if conducted without access
the federal government’s informational databases. As such, the benefits
of eliminating the Regional Center program would outweigh the costs of
sacrificing convenience.
In addition, strictly enforcing several of the original requirements—
particularly active investment and calculation of job creation—would
both enforce investor compliance and ensure the economic success of the
EB-5 Program. Under the current adjudication of I-829 forms, active
investment and creation of 10 jobs do not need to be conclusively shown
to remove conditional residency.207 Consequently, the economic benefits
that were intended to be the basis of EB-5 investors’ citizenship cannot be
verified. The HSI memo suggested that “the EB-5 Program should be
206.
207.
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open only to active investors involved in managing and directing a business
enterprise . . . provid[ing] a heightened degree of certainty regarding the
intentions of the alien applicant. Passive investors are too far removed
from these projects to have any verifiable connections or ties.”208 Further,
restricting the types of investors who qualify for the EB-5 visa will also
serve to reduce the number of applications and approvals, allowing CIS to
conduct more thorough reviews and exercise more oversight throughout the
investment process and grant of citizenship.
CIS should also edit the forms (I-526, I-829, I-924, and I-924A) currently
used by CIS, Regional Centers, and alien investors to require more
background information at the time of application. These forms do not
collect enough information to determine the validity of either the Regional
Centers, the alien investors, or the source of the investor’s funds.209
Requiring additional background information on alien investors (such as
political affiliation, criminal record, and biometrics) would allow EB-5
background checks to more closely monitor the same concerns as CFIUS
screens for and has previously identified as problematic.
In addition, the minimum investment amount should be raised. In the
internal memo, “HSI proposed increasing the threshold investment
amount to $2,000,000 and $1,000,000 for Targeted Employment Areas,
as the minimum investment amounts have not changed since the inception
of [the EB-5 Program].”210 Raising the required investment amounts
would make fraud more inconvenient and provide a more legitimate basis
to meet the job creation goals of the program. Further, increasing the
minimum investment amount would likely attract less investors, enabling
CIS to spend more time checking each application for security concerns.
The investor visa programs created by other countries may also serve
as models for modifying the EB-5 Program. Other countries with investor
visas include the UK, Australia, Canada, Austria, Germany, and Spain.
Of the countries with investor visas, very few offer citizenship.211 Many

208. See Grassley Letter, supra note 195.
209. See generally I-526 Instructions, supra note 38; I-829 Instructions, supra note
202.
210. See Grassley Letter, supra note 195.
211. See generally Study of the United States Immigrant Investor Pilot Program (EB5), IIUSA (May 18, 2010), available at http://iiusa.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/
IIUSA-economic-impact-research-project-packet-AUBER-2012.pdf. Austria does offer
direct citizenship by investment upon an investment of 4 million euros. Bulgaria, Dominica,
and Montenegro also offer direct citizenship. The Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Hong Kong,
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of the other countries also use a point-based system for administering
visas—using factors such as education, occupation, language proficiency,
age, and work experience to select applicants most likely to produce
economic benefits.212 In addition, several of the nations offering investor
visas automatically flag applications of investors from countries considered
potential threats and subject those applications to additional scrutiny.213
Significantly, several of the countries offering investor visas have expressed
security concerns with their programs.214 For example, in February 2014,
Canada terminated its immigrant investor program, which was similar to
the EB-5 Program.215 In its 2014 budget report, the Canadian Ministry of
Finance wrote that the investor visa
significantly undervalued Canadian permanent residence, providing a pathway to
Canadian citizenship in exchange for a guaranteed loan that is significantly less
than our peer countries require. . .There is also little evidence that immigrant
investors as a class are maintaining ties to Canada or making a positive economic
contribution to the country.216

An alternative to the EB-5 Program altogether would be to offer tax
incentives to promote foreign investment. As the EB-5 Program was created
to stimulate the economy,217 tax incentives to invest in the United States
could be offered instead of EB-5 visas. Over the past two decades, many
Governments have implemented incentives to attract private capital to

Iceland, Switzerland, the UK, Latvia, Singapore, Monaco, Panama, and New Zealand do
not.
212. See id. at 78. The point-based systems for immigration was pioneered by Canada
and has since been adopted by the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. Though the U.S.
considered the point-based system in 2007, it was never adopted or applied to the EB-5
visa. Id.
213. The UK, for example, automatically sets aside investor visa (Tier 1) applications
made by nations of several countries, including Russia, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, and Somalia.
214. See, e.g., Vanessa Kortekaas & Helen Warrel, Concern Grows Over Checks on
‘Investor’ Visa Applicants, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013) (“In 2008, when investor
visas were introduced, 43 foreign nationals successfully applied for them. But, last year,
the number of visas granted surged to 470—about half of which went to Russian and Chinese
applicants. However, some of the wealth managers involved in verifying foreign millionaires’
funds and the UK investments they later make have raised questions about the level of
checks conducted by the Home Office.”).
215. Canada’s Citizenship and Immigration Minister Chris Alexander, issued the
Economic Action Plan (EAP) 2014 on February 11, 2014 and announced the government’s
intent to terminate the federal Immigrant Investor Program (IIP) and Federal Entrepreneur
(EN) Program. Press release available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/
releases/2014/2014-02-11.asp.
216. Id.
217. See “Employment Creation Immigrant Visa (EB-5) Program Recommendations,”
supra note 11, at 4 (the EB-5 provision was “intended to provide new employment for
U.S. workers and to infuse new capital in the country.).
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further their countries’ economic goals.218 As part of the efforts to encourage
investment, tax incentives are increasingly becoming part of the measures
adopted to promote FDI.219 Tax incentives include “reduced tax rates on
profits, tax holidays, accounting rules that allow accelerated depreciation
and loss carry forwards for tax purposes, and reduced tariffs on imported
equipment, components, and raw materials, or increased tariffs to protect
the domestic market for import substituting investment projects.”220
China, for example, offers a reduced income rate for foreign investment
varying by region, as a means of encouraging investment in targeted
development zones.221 India, on the other hand, offers a tax exemption on
profits of firms engaged in tourism or travel.222 In addition, Ireland provides
write-offs for investors’ expenditures on certain construction projects.223
The United States could similarly employ tax measures to encourage
foreign investment and serve as a substitute for EB-5 visas.
VII. CONCLUSION
The tension between strengthening the economy and preserving
national security is increasingly apparent in CFIUS scrutiny and recent
revelations about the EB-5 visa. Congress’ grand expectations of EB-5
visas rejuvenating the American economy, for the most part, have been
unfulfilled. And though the past two years have seen a massive surge in
the number of EB-5 applications, relaxed requirements and several fraud
scandals demonstrate that the economic value of EB-5 visas remain
218. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TAX INCENTIVES AND
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A GLOBAL SURVEY 11 (2000), available at http://unctad.
org/en/Docs/iteipcmisc3_en.pdf. Countries have employed measures such as “liberalizing
the laws and regulations for the admission and establishment and foreign investment
projects; providing guarantees for repatriation of investment and profits; and establishing
mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes.” Id. at 11.
219. Id. “Over the past two decades, most Governments have been actively promoting
their countries as investment locations to attract scarce private capital and associated
technology and managerial skills in order to help achieve their development goals. They
have increasingly adopted measures to facilitate the entry of foreign direct investment
(FDI). Examples of such measures include liberalizing the laws and regulations for the
admission and establishment of foreign investment projects; providing guarantees for
repatriation of investment and profits; and establishing mechanisms for the settlement of
investment disputes. Tax incentives are also part of these promotional efforts.” Id.
220. Id. at 12
221. Id. at 76.
222. Id. at 12.
223. Id. at 126.
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unclear. In light of increasingly CFIUS scrutiny on foreign investments
and the HSI memo’s indication that the EB-5 visas have been used to
evade security checks, the costs of continuing the EB-5 Visa Program as
it currently exists may well outweigh the benefits that the program provides.
Recent growth in the number of applications filed and revelations of
EB-5 misuse call into question the prudence of allowing the EB-5 Visa
Program to continue as is. Given the shifts in national security threats from
physical attack to cyber penetration, as well as upcoming immigration
reform, promptly making several changes to limit the EB-5 Program would
be consistent with both national security policy and immigration practice.
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